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COMPETITION IN OR FOR THE FIELD:
WHICH IS BETTER?
BY EDUARDO ENGEL, RONALD FISCHER AND ALEXANDER GALETOVIC1
March, 2002
Abstract
In many circumstances, a principal, who wants prices to be as low as possible, must contract with
agents who would like to charge the monopoly price. This paper compares a Demsetz auction, which awards
an exclusive contract to the agent bidding the lowest price (competition for the field) with having two agents
provide the good under (imperfectly) competitive conditions (competition in the field). We obtain a simple
sufficient condition showing unambiguously which option is best. The condition depends only on the shapes
of the surplus function of the principal and the profit function of agents, and is independent of the particular
duopoly game played ex post. We apply this condition to three canonical examples—procurement, royalty
contracts and dealerships—and find that whenever marginal revenue for the final good is decreasing in the
quantity sold, a Demsetz auction is best. Moreover, a planner who wants to maximize social surplus also
prefers a Demsetz auction. 
Key words: Demsetz auction, double marginalization, franchising, joint vs. separate auctions, monopoly,
procurement, dealerships, royalty contracts
JEL classification: D44, L12, L92
1 Introduction
Consider a principal that needs to buy a good or service and has two procurement alternatives. On the one
hand, it can award an exclusive contract to the agent offering the lowest price, as in a standard Demsetz
(1968) auction. In this case, there will be intense ex ante price competition (‘competition forthe field’),
but in the aftermath, the agent will always charge the maximum price allowed by the contract. The other
option is to award two independent supply contracts and rely on ex post competition (‘competition inthe
field’). Then agents will consider the probabilities of different ex post duopoly games when negotiating
their contracts. If they anticipate that with high probability there will be intense price competition, they will
participate only if they obtain high profits in the rare cases in which they collude. Thus, the prospect of
intense competition inthe field softens competition forthe field.2 This motivates the question we address in
this paper: Should the principal contract with one or two agents?
The answer does not seem straightforward. A basic difficulty is that the appropriate specification of the
ex post duopoly game depends on particular aspects of the situation.3 M reover, many duopoly games have
multiple equilibria and there are no a priori compelling reasons to choose one over another. Nevertheless,
in this paper we obtain a simple sufficient condition that shows unambiguously which option is better. This
condition depends only on the shapes of the surplus function of the principal and the profit function of
each agent, and is independent of the duopoly game played ex post. We then apply this condition to study
three canonical examples—procurement, royalty contracts and dealerships. We find that whenever marginal
revenue is decreasing in the quantities, a Demsetz auction is unambiguously better. Moreover, a planner
who wants to maximize social surplus also prefers a Demsetz auction.
Our point of departure is a standard setting where a principal wants the final price of the good or service
to be as low as possible, but agents prefer the monopoly price. The principal can either run a Demsetz
auction for an exclusive contract, or auction two separate contracts to different agents who then produce
perfect substitutes and compete. With a Demsetz auction, the ex post equilibrium price equals the winning
bid. By contrast, when there are two contracts, the price depends on the outcome of ex post competition.
We do not specify the second stage game, but summarize itsoutcomeas follows: ex ante the equilibrium
price is a random variable with an arbitrary distributionF whose support is bounded above by the maximum
price allowed by the contract. In some states of nature agents will succeed in colluding and prices will be
close to the winning bid; in other states agents will compete intensely and prices will be much lower.4
We assume that the principal and the agents are risk neutral. Nevertheless, the main result of the paper
exploits the fact that a Demsetz auction eliminates variability in the equilibrium price. To get the intuition
2This terminology is due to Chadwick (1859).
3In this paper we abstract from complications due to incomplete contracting and asymmetric information.
4There are several interpretations forF . In one of them, it describes agents’ uncertainty about ex post market conditions and
potential collusive prices. In another, firms always collude at the price that maximizes joint profits, but there is a positive probability
of a successful antitrust case against them, leading to a price equal to marginal costs. Similarly, in the specific case of dealerships,
the upstream firm may try to prevent the double marginalization associated with collusion by penalizing those agreements between
franchisors that are detected.
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in a simple setting, assume that the agents’ profits,π, are increasing and concave in the equilibrium price,
and that the principal’s surplus function,S is decreasing and linear in the equilibrium price.5 Consider
next what happens if the principal substitutes two independent contracts by a Demsetz auction. Clearly,
this eliminates the price variability described byF . And sinceπ is concave in price and the participation
constraint always binds, the price that results from a Demsetz auction must be lower than the average with
two agents and ex post competition, i.e., competition forthe field leads to lower prices than competition in
the field. Thus, a Demsetz auction is better for the principal when her surplus function is linear. It is easily
seen, as well, that if the surplus functionS is sufficiently convex, separate contracts may be better, because
then the principal likes price variability. Our main result generalizes this intuition and shows that a Demsetz
auction is unambiguously better when the composition of the principal’s surplus function and the inverse
profit function,S ◦π−1, is strictly concave. Conversely, when this composite function is strictly convex two
separate contracts are unambiguously better.
As in the theory of expected utility, we find that this general result is equivalent to a simple condition that
compares the curvatures of the surplus and profit functions. This condition is quite similar to the necessary
and sufficient condition for a utility function to be more risk averse than the other (Pratt’s [1964] theorem)
and makes it easier to compare competition in the field with competition for the field. The condition amounts
to checking a relation that involves only the first and second derivatives ofS and π. We illustrate the
usefulness of this condition in the applications section, showing that a Demsetz auction is preferred by the
principal in all cases considered—procurement, royalty contracts, dealerships—whenever marginal profits
are decreasing in quantities.
Our paper is related to the literature of monopoly regulation via franchising which was pioneered by
Chadwick (1859) and Demsetz (1968) (see also Stigler [1968], Posner [1972], Williamson [1975], Riordan
and Sappington [1987], Spulber [1989, ch. 9], Laffont and Tirole [1993, chs. 7 and 8], Harstad and Crew
[1999] and Engel, Fischer and Galetovic [2001 a, b]). We extend this literature by studying Demsetz auctions
in contexts where imperfect competition “in the field” is feasible and is an alternative to a standard Demsetz
auction.
The applications we study suggest that our paper is also related to the literature on the “double marginal-
ization” problem in monopoly pricing (see Spengler [1950] for the seminal contribution and Tirole [1988,
ch. 4] for a review of the literature). Our result implies that when marginal revenue is decreasing in the quan-
tity sold and downstream competition is imperfect, auctioning an exclusive contract is better than relying on
ex post imperfect competition.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the general model and prove the main
result of the paper. In section 3 we apply this general result to study four applications. Section 4 concludes
5While we assume that profit and surplus functions are linear in money (that is, they are risk neutral in money terms), neither
the agents’ profit function nor the principal’s surplus function need, in general, be linearin the equilibrium price, i.e., they are risk
averse (or loving) in prices. For example, profit functions are typically quasiconcave in price. By contrast, when the agent is a
planner who wants to maximize consumer surplus, the principal’s objective function is convex in prices.
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and is followed by a brief appendix.
2 General model and main result
A risk neutral principal wants to contract the production of a good at two plants or locations.6 Output from
one plant is a perfect substitute for the output of the other. If the equilibrium price isp, an agent producing
at one plant makes profitsπ(p), with π′(p) > 0 for p∈ [p, pm), whereπ(p) = 0 and pm = argmaxp π(p).
Furthermore,π′(pm) = 0 andπ′′(pm) < 0. On the other hand, the principal’s surplus isS(p) if agents charge
p, with S ′(p) < 0. Hence there is a conflict of interest: while agents would like to increase prices up topm,
the principal wants the price to be as low as possible.
The principal may award both plants jointly (J), so that they are run by one agent; or separately (S), so
that two agents run one plant each and compete. The principal auctions both contracts. When both plants
are awarded jointly, the winning bid is denoted bypJ and per-plant profits for the agent are equal toπ(pJ).7
On the other hand, when plants are awarded to different agents, the minimum winning bid, common across
plants, is denoted bypS. In this case agents are uncertain both about whether they will be able to collude,8
and, if they do, about the price abovep at which they will collude.9 We assume that each agent serves half
the demand at a common equilibrium pricep, and denote byF(p) the cdf with support[p, pS] that describes
their common beliefs about the realization of this price.10
We make the essential assumption thatex-anteexpected gross profits per plant under a joint or a separate




π(p)dF(p) = π(pJ) = u+ I ,
whereu is the agent’s reservation utility andI stands for any sunk setup cost. There exist many agents that
could produce the good, all of them with the same value of(u+ I).
Condition 1 implies that benefits for agents are independent of whether the principal auctions production
at both plants jointly or separately. Or, in the standard guise of principal-agent theory, Condition 1 is the
participation constraint that the principal must obey. Note also that ifF(p) is degenerate, Condition 1
implies that under separate auctions the price will bepJ, so that joint and separate auctions are identical. We
rule out this possibility by assumption in what follows.
6All that follows extends trivially to the case ofn locations.
7We assumepJ ≤ pm.
8Caillaud and Tirole (2001) consider this possibility in the context of essential facilities.
9That is, we assume that prices are such that agents do not lose money ex post, sinceπ(p) = 0.
10Competition in practice is generally neither static nor symmetric. We avoid complications by concentrating on stationary
equilibria and we use symmetry due to the lack of consensus on how to model collusion in asymmetric games.
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When plants are awarded jointly, the principal’s benefit is denotedWJ ≡ S(pJ). On the other hand, when






From the assumptions we made onπ, it follows thatπ−1 : [π(p),π(pm)]→ [p, pm] is well defined, increasing
and convex. We then have the following central result of the paper:
Proposition 1 If S ◦π−1 is strictly concave, thenWJ > WS. If S ◦π−1 is strictly convex, thenWS > WJ.

















where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality and our assumption thatF is not degenerate, and the
identity after the inequality from Condition 1.
A surprising feature of this result is that we have not imposed any condition on the distribution of
possible collusive outcomesF . Hence, in order to compare joint and separate auctions, it is sufficient to
examine the ‘primitive’ functionsπ, andS , and one can ignore the exact specification of the ex post game
between the agents.
This result depends crucially on Condition 1, which ensures that softer competition when the partici-
pation constraint becomes more demanding (that is,ū+ I increases). In the case of joint production, this
means softer competition for the franchise, while in the case of separate production it means less competition
between both agents after they begin producing.
The following result provides a simple characterization for the concavity ofS ◦π−1.








for all p∈ [p, pm). Since, by assumption,π′ > 0 andS ′ < 0 in the relevant range, equation (1) is equivalent
to
S ′′π′ < S ′π′′.(2)
Moreover, the converse of condition (1) is necessary and sufficient forS ◦π−1 to be convex.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 If π is strictly concave, then the concavity ofS is sufficient for a joint contract to be better than
two separate contracts.
We can use Proposition 2 and Figures 1 and 2 to examine the intuition underlying our main result.
Suppose thatS is linear,π strictly concave, two separate contracts are auctioned, and in equilibriump can









2S(pm) (see Figure 1). SinceS
is linear andπ concave, Proposition 2 holds, and a joint auction is better than a separate auction. Why?
Condition 1 implies that12π(pm) = π(pJ). As is straightforward from Figure 1a, concavity ofπ implies that
pJ < 12 p+
1
2 pm. Hence the principal obtains a lower average price with a joint auction.







2 pm) < S(pJ) (see Figure 1b). Note that the same reasoning
applies to any probability distributionF with support in the interval[p, pm].
It can now easily be seen why strict concavity ofS is sufficient for a joint auction to be better when
π is concave. Eliminating variability inp is an added bonus for the principal, sinceES(p) < S(Ep) for
all distributionsF . Conversely, whenS is convex, a separate auction may (but need not) be better. Figure
2 depicts exactly the same case as Figure 1, except thatS is convex, so that now the principal likes price
variability. For the particular distribution depicted in this figure, the principal is indifferent between a joint
and a separate auction. Essentially, the gain of a lower expected pricep attained with a joint auction is
exactly offset by the fall in the expected surplus due to lower price variability. WithS sufficiently convex
and for a givenπ, the gains from a lower expected price are outweighed by the utility loss which stems from
losing “high” surpluses.
3 Applications
In this section we use Proposition 2 to study three canonical applications: procurement (the principal buys
the production of the plants), dealerships (agents buy an input from the principal and incur some costs to
transform and resell it) and royalties (the principal receives a fixed fee per unit sold by the agent without
11This can be put in the more standard terms of principal–agent theory. From Condition 1 it follows that the agent’s participation
constraint is12π(pm) = π(pJ). Sinceπ is concave, the average price that the agent requires in order to participate is lower with a


















































Figure 2: Intuition underlying the main result: WhenS is convex, anything goes.
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engaging in production). In these cases functionsS andπ can be derived from standard demand and cost
functions.
In all the cases that follow we assume that the value of the marginal unit atq is P(q), with P′ < 0. We also
assume that the inverse function ofP, P−1(p) ≡ D(p) is well defined in the appropriate range. Obviously
D′ < 0. Agenti incurs in total costc(qi) when producingqi units of output at a given plant, withc′ > 0 and
c′′ ≥ 0.12
We find that in all three cases a sufficient condition for a joint contract to be better for the principal is
that marginal revenue be decreasing in quantities. In addition, we show that whenever this holds, a social
planner also prefers a joint auction. The following two lemmas, which are proven in the appendix, will be
useful when establishing this result:
Lemma 1 (i) P′(q) = 1D′(P(q)) ; (ii) P
′′(q) =− D′′(P(q)){D′(P(q))}3 ; (iii) D′(p) = 1P′(D(p)) ; (iv) D′′(p) =−
P′′(D(p))
{P′(D(p))}3 .
Lemma 2 2P′(q)+qP′′(q) < 0 if and only ifDD′′−2(D′)2 < 0.
3.1 Procurement
We first consider fixed-price procurement.13 The principal wants to buy an input as cheaply as possible,
and can choose between one or two suppliers. Clearly, the principal cares (directly) only about the pricep
paid per unit, and not about production costsc (of course, as in any principal-agent problem, the principal
cares about the agents’ costs indirectly through the participation constraint). HenceS(p)≡ R ∞p D(s)dsis the





is the surplus of each agent with a separate auction; with















S ′ = −D < 0,
S ′′ = −D′ > 0





12This condition implies no loss of generality. Ifc′′ < 0, marginal and average costs are decreasing and auctioning jointly is
clearly better.
13In fixed-price procurement contracts, the buyer and the seller agree on a price, and the seller assumes all cost risk. At the
other extreme, in a cost-plus contract the buyer reimburses the seller’s cost. As argued in Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 662), only
fixed-price contracts are relevant when it is too costly for the buyer to audit the subcost of the supplier.
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Applying Propositions 1 and 2 to this case, the following result follows:
Proposition 3 A sufficient condition forWJ > WS is that
2P′+qP′′ < 0,(3)
that is, that marginal revenue be decreasing inq.
Proof: Since in the relevant range we haveS ′ < 0 andπ′ > 0, it follows from Proposition 2 that it suffices
to show that (3) ensures that
S ′′π′ < S ′π′′(4)




Lemma 2 implies that the left hand side of (5) is negative for allp∈ [p, pm] if marginal revenue is decreasing
in q. On the other hand, the right hand side of (5) is positive, becausec′′ ≥ 0 andπ′ > 0 for all p∈ [p, pm).
3.2 Royalties
Consider a licensing agreement where the licensee pays the principal a royaltyt per unit produced and sold,
but no fixed fee.14 For example, this is the case when a patent holder licences the right to manufacture the
good, but does not participate in the product market.15 In this case the principal is worried about downstream
double marginalization, and, givent, would like the licensee to sell as much as possible. The principal’s sur-
plus isS(p) = tD(p) (where nowD is market demand for the good), andπ(p) = 12(p− t)D(p)−c(D(p)/2)
is the surplus of each licensee.
We then have that Proposition 3 also applies, i.e.2P′+qP′′ < 0 is sufficient forWJ > WS. We postpone
the proof until the next subsection.
As is well known, a disadvantage of licensing through royalties is that any market power exercised
downstream reduces industry profits (this is the double marginalization problem). One solution is to auction
14Calvert (1964) and Taylor and Silberston (1973) observe that about 50% of all licensing contracts specify royalties only. Also,
Lafontaine and Shaw (1999) show that, on average, franchise fees amount to no more than 8% of actual payouts from franchise
holders to franchisees.
15See Tirole (1988, ch. 10.8) for a review of the literature on licensing.
10
off the monopoly for a fixed fee and charge no royalty.16 In that case, the principal does not want competition
downstream. When fixed lump-sum fees are not feasible, the patent holder must make her income through
royalties. But then the double marginalization problem bites, and controlling market power downstream
becomes an issue. Our result implies that decreasing marginal revenue is sufficient for a Demsetz auction
(ex ante competition) to be better than ex post competition when ex post market structure is uncertain.
One could argue that an exclusive contract with a two part tariff is enough to prevent the double marginal-
ization problem. Note, however, that to choose the right fixed fee the principal must know the demand curve.
Our analysis implies that when marginal revenue is decreasing in quantities a joint franchise solves the prob-
lem.
3.3 Dealerships
Dealerships are similar to licensing, except for the fact that the principal’s cost increases with the number
of units sold. For example, consider the case of car dealerships. Cars are provided by the manufacturer at
a fixed price and the dealers are free (within limits set by list price of the manufacturer) to bargain their
markup with clients. The question for the manufacturer then is whether to have dealerships that are, say,
spatially close and thus compete with each other, or to have one dealer with a cap on the resale price.17
Assume that̃c(q) is the principal’s cost function, with̃c′, c̃′′ > 0. ThenS(p) = tD(p)− c̃(D(p)), and, as
with licensing,π(p) = 12(p− t)D(p)−c(D(p)/2). Then:18
S ′ = (t− c̃′)D′,
















We now show that2P′+qP′′ < 0 is again sufficient forWJ > WS. As before, sinceπ′ > 0 for all p∈ [p, pm),
it follows, after some straightforward but tedious algebra, thatS ′′π′ < S ′π′′ for all p∈ [p, pm) is equivalent
to






which holds because the right hand side is (obviously) positive, while the left hand side is negative because
16See Gallini (1984) and Katz and Shapiro (1985).
17We abstract from other important considerations in these contracts, such as service quality.
18Note that royalties corresponds to the case wherec̃≡ 0.
11
of Lemma 2.
3.4 The social planner
Next, we consider the case of a social planner who wants to contract for the provision of a service. As an
example, consider highway franchises. In many developing countries roads are being franchised to private
firms. In exchange for toll revenue, the franchise holder finances, builds, operates and maintains the road.19
In some cases roads are natural monopolies, and are awarded to the firm offering to charge the lowest toll.
Nevertheless, when there is more than one way to get from one point to another, as is often the case in
large cities, different roads could be awarded to different franchise holders.20 Should the regulator award all
franchises to the same firm or award several highway franchises and let them compete? Another example is
the auction of the rights to provide local telephony in rural areas, where the auction is based on the price of a
standard local call. Is it better to have a single company provide the service or would it be better to allocate
two companies to the area?













S ′ = (p−c′)D′,
S ′′ = (p−c′)D′′+D′− 1
2
(D′)2c′′,









which is the same condition as in the case of procurement. Hence, again decreasing marginal revenue is
sufficient forWJ > WS.
Finally, we present a concrete example which suggests that welfare gains may be important when using
a Demsetz auction instead of separate auctions.
Example We use the notation and definitions from the preceding subsection and assumeD(p) = 1− p,
19See Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2001b) for a discussion of highway franchising.
20One example is the La Dormida project in Chile, which would compete with Route 68, the highway that currently joins Chile’s
capital, Santiago, with the port of Valparaı́so. The Ministry of Public Works weighed the benefits of joint and separate auctions.
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c(q) = c0. We also assume that the separate and joint auction of both franchises dissipate all rents.21 Since
S ′(p) =−D(p) = p−1 andπ(p) = p(1− p)−c0, we have thatπ′′/π′ < S ′′/S ′ if and only if−2/(1−2p) <
−1/(1− p) for all p< pm = 1/2, which indeed holds. It follows that the sufficient condition for Proposition
2 is satisfied.
Assume that the ex-ante distribution of market structure outcomes in the case of separate franchisesF
is a point distribution with weights of1/2 on collusion at the bid price and1/2 on price competition with
price equal to marginal cost (zero). ThenpJ is the smallest solution top(1− p) = c0 while pS is the smallest
solution to12 p(1− p) = c0. The existence of a solution in both cases requiresc0 < 1/8. Then:
















> 0, ∀c0 > 0,
Furthermore, in this example a joint auction can lead to a welfare increase of as much as 17%.
4 Conclusion
We have shown a simple condition for a principal to prefer to contract the provision of a good from a single
agent via a Demsetz auction, rather than by having multiple agents provide the good under (imperfectly)
competitive conditions. In the canonical cases of procurement, royalty contracts and dealerships, decreasing
marginal revenue ensures that a Demsetz auction (ex ante competition) is better for the principal thanex
postcompetition. This result is surprising, because it is independent of the expected intensity of ex post
competition.
The results in this paper do not necessarily imply an endorsement of monopolies, since many relevant
factors were left out of our analysis. First, we assumed a single service quality, which can be verified at no
cost, even though in most cases quality will be worse in the absence of competition. Second, we ignored
political economy and asymmetric information considerations, which may be worse when a regulator deals
with a monopoly. Third, we rule out incomplete contracting and the hold-up problem. For example, a
manufacturer might prefer to have competing dealers in order to avoid a bilateral monopoly. Finally, we
have not considered the possibility of technical change in the delivery of franchise services, a factor that if
present makes competition more desirable if it accelerates the introduction of new technologies.
On the other hand, there are some aspects we left out which strengthen the case for a joint auction. First,
if agents are risk averse, the preference for joint auctions increases. More importantly, we have assumed
that a joint contract does not lead to any cost savings; or, conversely, that ex post competition, which
implies more than one agent, does not lead to (fixed) cost duplication. A common concern when formerly
monopolistic markets are liberalized is that competition may lead to inefficient cost duplication through
“excessive” entry.22 With a Demsetz auction, however, cost duplication is no longer an issue. Our result
21Thus the common value of both expressions in Condition 1 is zero.
22See, for example, Armstrong (2000).
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indicates that an exclusive contract may be preferable even when it does not prevent fixed-cost duplication.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2










Differentiating both sides of (8) with respect top and using (9) leads to:




where all terms on the r.h.s. are evaluated atπ−1(p). Sinceπ′ > 0 this implies thatS ◦ π−1 is concave if
and only if S ′′π′ < S ′π′′. And sinceS ′ < 0 andπ′ > 0 we conclude thatπ′′/π′ < S ′′/S ′ is necessary and
sufficient for concavity ofS ◦π−1. The result now follows.
B Proof of Lemma 2
To prove (i) and (ii) totally differentiate the identityq≡ D[P(q)] with respect toq to obtain
1 = D′P′,





from which (ii) follows by substituting1D′ for P
′. The proof of (iii) and (iv) is analogous and we omit it.
C Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: Sufficiency: use (i) and (ii) in Lemma 1 to substitute forP′ andP′′. Necessity: use (iii) and (iv) to
substitute forD, D′ andD′′.
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